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1. Questions for Aid Agencies
Except for making the rather uninteresting observation that
the developed countries sometimes, or often, use what they call
'aid' as an instrument of foreign policy, aid agencies tend to
turn a blind eye to the political dimensions of their activities.
There are several reasons why this should be so, the most obvious
of which is that the principal rival of an aid agency, within its
own governmental structure, is usually the ministry of foreign
affairs. If the agency were to admit that the rational allocation
of its resources required political analysis of the potential
recipients, its case for separate existence would be gravely
weakened, since political analysis is normally regarded as the
business of the ministry of foreign affairs. So aid agencies tend
to deny the political quality of the developmental process,
taking refuge in 'strictly objective' economic criteria and
'technical' analysis. Political factors come in only as 'obstacles',
preventing aid agencies from doing their allegedly apolitical job.
This formulation has the additional advantage, from the aid
agency's point of view, of identifying the interventibn of the
ministry of foreign affairs as one such obstacle, thereby en-
listing the support of the aid lobby in its self-interested
fight for survival.
This habit of speech is relatively recent. Under the
Mutual Security Act of the l950s, United States aid was explicitly
directed towards securing specified political postures from the
recipients. Its allocation was consequently based on quite careful
analysis of the way in which it might affect the internal
political standing of the governmental entities which received it.
Another recent habit of speech, closely related to the
appeal to non-political criteria, is the suppression of values.
If one compares the basic policy documents of the American, British,
French and German aid programmes of the early l960s, one finds
that they were highly explicit concerning the values that were
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being apilied in the selection of 'developmental' priorities,
and that there were striking differences between the values
apnlied in different aid programmes. (We may assume here that
all aid irograrnmes have some develonmental content, however
small). With the formalisation of aid programmes from about
1965 onwards, this feature disanpeared. The 1965 White Paper of
the Ministry of Overseas Develonment, containing one of the
strongest recorded official assertions that the basis of an
aid programme is a moral one, omitted to specify that moral
basis in a manner which would allow one to use it in the
evaluation of alternative paths of allegedly develonmental
policy. Here the obstacle seems to have been the desire to play
down the necessarily interventionist character of aid, the
desire not to be seen imnosing alien values on states which
were highly sensitive to any infringement of sovereigntY.
These two inhibitions have led aid agencies to overlook
factors which have a bearing on their own stated objectives.
How could one assess the effect of aid in sunort of rich
industrialists in Pakistan, without taking account of the
political dimension? How can one possibly allocate aid in
support of a Process called 'development' - which is a value
term - without soecifying the values to be used and without
examining all the effects of a given allocation in the light
of these values?
Dudley Seers, in trying to break through these inhibitions
concentrates on the question of values. Having specified his
values, he asks in effect how an aid agency can promote these
values, in circumstances in which there is a high probability
that aid will go to users who hold very different values, thus
perverting the underlying developmental íntention My purposes
in this supolementary note are:
To argue that political judgment offers a more fruitful
ainroach to the problem than moral judgment (though I
admit that it is not always easy to distinguish between
the two);
To show that the evaluative or moral questions can be
largely reduced to a set of emnirical questions in
political analysis, leaving a residual moral question
which is easily answered with a widely acceptable value
premise;
To draw policy conclusions.
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In short, the question I am discussing is: how far can we go
towards the solution of the problem posed by Dudley Seers on
the basis of what we know, as distinct from what we profess?
It is convenient to divide the empirical questions into
four broad areas, which are listed below. The alternative
formulations (a.f.) in parentheses suggest rather different
questions, but I believe that it is illuminating to take the
first formulation and its alternative in conjunction.
Who are the aid-users? (a.f. Who benefits from aid?)
What do aid-users use it for? (a.f. What are the effects
of aid?)
What sorts of value judgment will be affected in applicat-
ion, by the answers to questions about aid-users? (a.f.
What sorts of value judgment can aid agencies effectively
apply?)
What strategies are available to aid agencies in the
application of value judgments about aid-users? (I have
no alternative formulation of this question).
All of these questions point in the direction of analysis
of internal political trends, which is one of the functions for
which rich countries spend money in maintaining diplomatic
missions overseas. In the best of all possible worlds, i.e. if
rich countries were politically committed to the promotion of
development, it would be rational to locate aid agencies within
foreign ministries, where the necessary skills are concentrated.
But foreign ministries have a nasty habit of seeing everything
in terms of a very confusing concept called 'the national
interest'. My policy conclusions, therefore, are focused on the
steps that would have to be taken by foreign ministries to re-
assure simple-minded people like myself, who believe that 'aid'
means 'help', that their political analysis was in the interest
of human welfare.
2. The Aid-Users
Defining 'aid' is always difficult, but in general we are
talking about resources transferred inter-governmentally by
governmental institutions whose activities are publicly justified
by reference to a process called 'development'. Thus, the
recipients of aid, or aid-users, are 'governments'. But the term
'government' merely refers to the area in which aid-users are
normally to be found, unless one is prepared to consider the
embarrassing alternative of aid to opposition groups. It is
not itself an identification of aid-users. It is not even a
very precise delineation of the area of search. (Where is the
'government' of Britain, and over what area does it extend?)
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If one uses the term 'government' in the narrowest sense,
as a synonym for 'rgime', by which I mean that small grotrn
which currently enjoys dominant power, one probably fails, in
using the term in this way, to identifv the most significant
grouos of aid-users in the broader governmental field. Aid
may have many different and conflicting users: the finance
ministry uses it to control the sectoral ministries; central
ministries use it to control provincial structures and
programmes; constituency-based noliticians and their ministerial
patrons use it to build local sunnort; economic olanners use it
as a channel of cornmunicatioon (an escaie route?) to the outside
world. Governments are not homogeneous. To use the concent
'government' in the identification of aid-users is likely to
obscure the more limited areas within which aid may have a
canacity, indirectly, to affect the 'rgime'.
3. Uses of Aid
This section is concerned only with uses, and hence out-
comes, other than those snecified in the formal agreements
concerning the uses to which the resources in question are to
be nut. One outcome of aid may be the establishment of the
project which it finances (thouh not necessarily, on the
Singer principle of fungibility ). What other uses does it
have? In particular, I am concerned with what are sometimes
termed, misleadingly, the 'nolitical effects' of aid.
These 'other' uses are of two main tynes, which I shall
call 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' . Intrinsic uses are uses which
inhere in the use specified in the agreement, but are not
stated. It is a mistake to think of economic and nolitical
uses as two senarate categories. 'Political' and 'economic'
are terms, not for different tynes of use, but for different
aspects of use. Examnles of intrinsic use are: rich industrial-
ists using aid to consolidate their control of resources;
'progressive' noliticians using the availability of aid to gain
acceptance for a land reform programme; middle-level civil
servants using overseas training to gain status and nromotion.
Intrinsic use is sometimes referred to as 'bias'.
Extrinsic uses are a less coherent class, since they are
not linked systematically to the snecified uses. But they aprear
1
H.W. Singer, "External Aid: for Plans or Projects?", Economic
Jourr&al, Vol. LXVII, No. 299, Seotember 1965. Singer argues
that donors, in financing projects of high priority, which
would probably have been undertaken anyway, are in reality
freeing the recipient's own resources for the financing of
some other project of which the donor is not aware.
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to be of three main types (apart, that is, from foreign policy
uses, with which this note is not concerned):
general re-inforcement;
policy endorsement;
domestic bargaining.
General re-inforcement, or what Dudley Seers calls the
'announcement effect', consists of the use of aid as evidence of
external general support for a rgime, in order to consolidate
internal support. It appears to be the rarest of the three types
of use, if only because, in societies sensitive to neo-colonialism,
evidence of external support is a dangerous card to play. By the
same reasoning, the withdrij.ùal of aid MAY have a supportive effect,
since it enables the regime to atribute domestic difficulties to
foreign hostility. The most conspicuous cases of general rein-
forcement, such as President Nasse's use of the Aswan High Dam,
are usually only consolidation of an earlier use of the with-
drawal of aid for the same purpose. (Other conspicuous examples
are Cuba/USSR and Tanzania/China). Where this use of aid does
occur, a general valuation of the regime is relevant to aid
agencies' decisions. But I repeat, it is rare.
It is in the area of policy endorsement that aid agencies
become most deeply involved in the extrinsic uses of their
resources. Indeed, some of them participate in these uses,
under the label of 'leverage'.
'Leverage' is the name given to the practice of allocating
aid in accordance with some sort of developmental assessment of
the policies pursued by the recipient. It is now to some extent
discredited, partly because its practitioners, notably the World
Bank and the AID, have found it extraordinarily difficult to work,
and partly because its opponents have criticised the values applied
by these agencies, or, more generally and less logically, disputed
their right to apply their own values in any way.
Any argument that suggests that aid should be provided or
withheld in accordance with an explicit valuation of the users
is an argument for leverage. All such arguments are open to
challenge on the evidence of past experience. Bullying, to give
the practice a plainer name, has unpredictable results. The
worm does turn. A question which arises in connection with the
current widespread advocacy of policies for improved employment
and income distribution is whether this consensus may be seen
by the aid-users as a new sort of neo-colonialism, using it
to discredit such policies in the context of their own societies.
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An odd twist to policy endorsement is what one might call
negative policy endorsement - the use, for instance, of an
advisory mission as a substitute for adopting the policy in
question.
The weakness of aid as an instrument for general rein-
forcement or policy endorsement leaves us with bargaining as
the only remaining type of extrinsic use which aid agencies may
be able to assimilate. There are two separate uses here: the
use of aid to strenghten the user's bargaining position (a
quantitative use): and the use of aid to change a bargaining
position (a qualitative use). Quantitative uses were cited
in the preceding section. They are not open to aid agencies,
as their perceived endorsement of a selected group in govern-
ment - e.g. the planning agency - is likely to weaken that
group's position. But they can certainly consider the ways
in which bias (or intrinsic uses) in the resources that
they offer may affect users' bargaining positions qualit-
atively.
4. Values
Values may be applied to action in two ways. They may give
rise to negative action, i.e. a decision not to participate in
the evaluated situation at all (e.g. a withdrawal of aid): or
they may give rise to a decision to do X rather than Y.
Just as condemnation of own government does not
lead most citizens to emigrate, so aid agencies are generally,
and rightly, interested in the second type of application
rather than the first.
The uderlying value of those who advocate the use of aid
for development is the relief of poverty. By analogy with the
law of diminishing returns, this entails that one values relief
for the poorest more highly than relief for the less poor. Hence
one values improved income distribution, improved employment
opportunities, etc. But once one has admitted the premise
concerning the relief of poverty, these subsidiary values
follow logically.
At this very general level, therefore, there does not seem
to be any rational reason for fundamental conflict over the values
to be applied, among those who profess any sort of developmental
values. But there is a real question about how to apply them,
given that not all aid-users are sincere in their profession of
developmental values. This is both a moral question, concerning
the right of aid agencies to impose developmental values (the
withdrawal of aid counting for this purpose as a sort of 25
imposition), and an empirical question concerning the feasible
optimum within the society that is being assessed.
All societies evolve within some set of historical limits.
A pattern which is judged good in one society may be outside
the historical limits of another. Such limits are in some measure
specific to particular societies. The use of historical method
to project these limits into the future, as a prediction of the
range of directions in which a society is likely to evolve, is
sometimes called 'common sense'. Historical method is different
from scientific method, which predicts, not on the basis of past
observations of the same society, but on past or present
observations of similar societies.
A regime is only one symptom of a more pervasive historical
condition of society. Common sense needs to be apnlied to the
assessment of a régime before one can evaluate it, since one can
only evaluate it in comparison with historically relevant alter-
natives. To apply generalised values without historical method
leads to mistakes. One may give a high score to President
Nyererein the historical context of Tanzania: but one should
probably also have given a high score to Prince Sihanouk in the
historical context of Cambodia. It is regrettable that the
application of generalised (puritan?) values led development
specialists to take little interest in Prince Sihanouk, and to
make little protest about his destruction. To take a more
complex example, does one give a high score to Mrs. Gandhi for
professing 'socialism', or a low score for coming to terms with
the un-socialist reality of Indian society? And what score should
one give to historically probable future governments in comparing
and connecting the short-term and long-term uses of aid? The use
of values should lead, not to a condemnation of governments, which
are part of the historical situation, but to the identification of
alternative forms of action within that situation. The difficult
questions here are both empirical and particular, not moral
and general.
5. Strategies
In principle, there are three types of strategy which an aid
agency can pursue in applying its values. It can make a general
judgment concerning the regime, and act accordingly to affect the
regime; it can ignore the problem, - regarding evaluation of the
regime as beyond its competence, and simply responding to requests;
or it can identify limited tasks, the total outcome of which is
not severely affected by the character of the regime in question.
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The first strategy seems to me impracticable on five grounds:
There is a widespread revulsion, with at least some substance
in it, against aid agencies acting as keepers of the aid
users' conscience.
The outcome is at least as likely to be negative as positive,
in value terms.
It encourages a dangerous tendency towards the application of
generalised values as a substitute for historical perception.
It tends to reduce the aid agency's room for manoevre to a
choice between staying in and getting out, which is the wrong
sort of choice. (Similarly, would one abandon a country
because its economic prospects of development were poor?)
Aid is probably one of the least significant forces keeping a
regime in power. But aid does do other things. To concentrate
on changing regimes, in which aid is unlikely to be signific-
ant, is to ignore the aid agency's comparative advantage.
The second strategy, ignoring the problem, seems to me
irrational, for the reasons given in the first section.
The third strategy, which has come to be associated with the
name of I.G. Patel, on the basis of a proposal made by him at
the Columbia Conference on the Pearson Report, seems to me the
only practicable possibility. Reconstruction after a cyclone
disaster (East Pakistan under Yahya Khan), or amelioration of
urban slums (Rio de Janeiro, Manila), are tasks worth pursuing
irrespective of the character of the regime. Assessment of the
extent to which these endeavours will be frustrated by the
character of the rgime itself, and of what steps can be taken
to isolate the task from those pressures, is a matter for
common sense, as I have used the term, not for moral judgment
or scientific method.
Policy Conclusions
The eight of my argument is directed towards more refined
analysis of internal political relationships as a means to
ensuring improved developmental outcomes from the activities
of aid agencies. This analysis is needed, not as a basis for
decisions to give or withhold aid from a regime as a whole,
but as a guide to needed modifications in the forms of aid
to take account of the particular social and political con-
texts in which it operates.
Six years ago, I argued that the most urgent change
needed in the structure of the British aid programme, to take
the neareSt ekample, was the establishment of more regional
development divisions in order to apply professional ( scient-
ific) analysis in the field. That issue has since been resolved.
Now I would argue that the most urgently needed change is a
stronger developmental orientation in the political ( coimnon
sense) reporting that trained diplomats already do rather well.
The target here is the official working at about second-
secretary level in chancery in an embassy or high commission,
who has possibly spent a year in the country previously
learning its language and customs, and whose job is simply to
report. Give him a thorough training in developmental analysis,
and the hardest part of the problem is solved.
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